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Comment
Theology and Science in the Orthodox World: 
Some Doubts from a Latin Perspective
Christoph Lüthy
Abstract: Efthymios Nicolaidis et alii open their essay with what amounts to a paradox: 
they maintain that Orthodox Christianity “scarcely participated in the making of the 
new European science” but also quote John William Draper’s positive assessment of 
the openness of the Orthodox Church to the sciences. Whether they manage to resolve 
this paradox is unclear. This response to their overview suggests that they neglect two 
key elements: the categorical difference between medieval scientia and modern sci-
ence; and the role of institutions such as universities and scientiﬁc societies. Further-
more, to gauge the relation of Orthodox Christianity to modern science, one would 
also have had to take the Russian Orthodox Church into account, as after the fall of 
Constantinople the Greek Orthodox Church was deprived of much of its political and 
institutional power.
n their essay, Efthymios Nicolaidis and his colleagues sketch the relation between science 
and Orthodox Christianity over a period of roughly two thousand years. Their very ﬁrst phrase 
introduces that relation thus: “Eastern Christianity scarcely participated in the making of the 
new European science”—the implication being that “Western Christianity” did participate. 
But a paradox emerges at once, as Nicolaidis et alii turn to citing John William Draper to the 
effect that, in contrast to Catholicism, the Greek Orthodox Church did not combat the new 
science but, rather, attempted to reconcile revealed truth and scientiﬁc rationality. “It would 
have been well for modern civilization if the Roman Church had done the same,” Draper sug-
gests in the passage quoted by Nicolaidis et alii. The following question obviously asserts itself 
forcefully: If the Orthodox Church had been so open to modern science, why did it “scarcely 
participate” in it? 
Whether, with their longue durée overview, Nicolaidis et alii manage to provide an answer 
to this paradox is not evident to me. Even less evident, in my view, is how the story they tell 
can be matched up with the one that is traditionally told about the emergence of science in 
Western Europe. Two of the key ingredients that deﬁne the Western narrative are missing from 
theirs: namely, the “internal” factor of the radically changing nature of “science” between the 
premodern and the modern age; and the “external” factor of the institutions that fostered—or 
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impeded—the development of modern science. In the essay under discussion, “science” seems to 
me to be black-boxed as much as the institutions and bodies that engaged in it or combated it. 
A DifferenT WAy Of fOrmuLATing The QueSTiOn
The Rise of Scientiﬁc Europe, 1500–1800, that highly useful course book edited by David Good-
man and Colin A. Russell, contains a number of signiﬁcant maps, three of which appear to be 
of particular relevance for our topic. Together, they seem to suggest a reformulation of the issue 
proposed by Nicolaidis and his colleagues.
The ﬁrst maps the “centres of translating Greek science, 500 –1500.” It has the Mediterra-
nean at the center, with Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa grouped around it. Lots of 
arrows are seen connecting the Greek-speaking world with Syriac-, Persian-, Arabic-, and Latin-
speaking areas, pointing to a thousand-year process of diffusion of Greek learning to other cul-
tures. With respect to the Latin-speaking world, the arrows on the map roughly correspond to 
Sten Ebbesen’s ﬁve distinctive periods in which Greek knowledge spread to the Latin West, the 
Hellenistic period being the ﬁrst and the Renaissance the last, with only “a tiny stream of Latin 
thought” ﬂowing back into the Greek environment in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.1
The second map is adapted from the 101st edition of Putzger’s Historischer Weltaltas (1990), 
and it shows “the spread of European universities” between the late twelfth century and the 
year 1500. The map contains a few dozen dots, with city names and dates attached to them, 
that cover an area with Lisbon as its westernmost point, Uppsala and Aberdeen as its northern-
most limits, Catania and Seville at its southernmost conﬁnes, and Fünfkirchen (the modern 
Pécs, in Hungary), Ofen (today’s Buda, also in Hungary), and Cracow (now in Poland) as the 
easternmost university cities.2 This map shows that while the medieval university system spread 
to the very limits of inhabited Europe in the west, north, and south, with the shores of the Atlan-
tic Ocean and the Mediterranean providing natural borders, it petered out in the east, with no 
natural obstacle visible on the map. In fact, the university system, while “supranational” (in the 
sense of transcending kingdoms and duchies), did not spread beyond the limits of the Catholic 
world and of Latin as the language of learning. What systems of education may have existed to 
the east of the Catholic, Latin world, in the domain of Greek and Russian Orthodoxy, remains 
as unexplained in that particular map as it does in most overviews of medieval learning. It is 
regrettable that Nicolaidis and his colleagues remain equally silent about higher education in 
Byzantium, although a comparison of its institutions with those arising in the West would surely 
have provided an important element in explaining the asymmetrical evolution of “science” in 
the Catholic and Orthodox worlds.3 Taken together, these two maps suggest a continued cul-
tural transfer from the Greek-speaking world to the Latin one but no inverse movement back 
into the Byzantine and Orthodox worlds, at either the intellectual or the institutional level.
The third map is equally striking. Adapted from James McClellan’s Science Reorganized 
(1985), it shows the location of scientiﬁc societies and academies in 1789. Once again, we 
are given a European map studded with dots and place-names.4 The area covered coincides 
widely with the second map, although the scarcity of organized scientiﬁc activity on the Iberian 
Peninsula and in the Eastern Hapsburg territories is conspicuous (telling us something about 
1 David Goodman and Colin A. Russell, eds., The Rise of Scientiﬁc Europe, 1500 –1800 (Sevenoaks: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 
map 1.3 (p. 20); and Sten Ebbesen, “Greek–Latin Philosophical Interaction,” in Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources, 
ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), pp. 15–30, on p. 28.
2 Goodman and Russell, eds., Rise of Scientiﬁc Europe, map 1.4 (p. 25).
3 See Robert Browning, “Universities, Byzantine,” in Dictionary of the Middle Ages, Vol. 12 (New York: Scribner’s, 1989), pp. 300–
302; and Browning, “ The Patriarchal School at Constantinople in the Twelfth Century,” Byzantion, 1962, 32:167–202. 
4 Goodman and Russell, eds., Rise of Scientiﬁc Europe (cit. n. 1), map 9.1 (p. 245).
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the effects of the Hapsburgs’ and Bourbons’ implementation of Counter-Reformation educa-
tional policies). The other element of discontinuity is constituted by that exceptional scientiﬁc 
society beyond the borders of the formerly Latin world—that is, the St. Petersburg Academy 
established by Tsar Peter the Great in 1724/1725 on the basis of plans originally designed by 
Leibniz. When viewed together, the second and third maps underscore the importance of the 
medieval university system for the birth of what by the eighteenth century began to be called 
“science” in several vernacular languages. They also show the slowness with which the insti-
tutionalization of that combination of systematic natural investigation, experimentalism, and 
the application of quantitative tools that we associate with the “Scientiﬁc Revolution” spread 
beyond the geographically limited area in which it ﬁrst took shape. Judging by the third map, 
it does not seem to have penetrated the Orthodox world, with the exception of St. Petersburg, 
or, for that matter, the Ottoman Empire.
With respect to Orthodox Europe, the three maps provoke a series of important questions, 
of which the two most obvious ones are the following. First, what happened in educational, 
philosophical, and scientiﬁc terms in that cultural space that, until the fall of Constantinople 
in 1453, was not only Christian but continued to radiate out to Latin Christianity? The empty 
spaces on Europe’s eastern ﬂank in the second and third maps amount to the proverbial la-
cuna that needs to be ﬁlled, a terra incognita that remains to be explored and brought into the 
general narrative of the history of science. The second question is this: How did the world of 
Orthodox Christianity react to the development of the new sciences in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries? In order to answer that second question, one would have had to look 
speciﬁcally at Russia, because the territory of Greek Orthodoxy had meanwhile fallen into 
Ottoman hands. But, regrettably, despite the title of their essay, Nicolaidis and his coauthors 
conﬁne themselves almost exclusively to the area deﬁned by modern Greece and therefore 
remain silent about the fairly successful Russian attempts to latch onto the scientiﬁc awaken-
ing of  Western Europe. It would have been important to learn what role the Russian Orthodox 
Church played in fostering, accommodating, or combating this development.
In short, for a satisfactory answer to the question concerning the relation between “Ortho-
dox Christianity” and “science,” one would need to understand, ﬁrst, how what Nicolaidis 
et alii summarily call “science” developed between the long Middle Ages and the birth of mod-
ern science; and, second, the nature of the teaching or research institutions that existed in the 
various time periods under review and the role that the ecclesiastical hierarchies of Orthodox 
Christianity played in them. 
TerminOLOgy
Up to now, I have put “science” in quotation marks, for the simple reason that what we call 
“science” today has very little to do with anything that existed in the Byzantine world—as, 
conversely, the Greek equivalent of the Latin “scientia,” namely “epistêmê,” has very little in 
common with what we nowadays call “science.” The latter is a collective enterprise carried 
out in research teams or laboratories by salaried “scientists” who seek provisional and empiri-
cally falsiﬁable answers to questions pertaining to the natural world. “Epistêmê,” or “scientia,” 
by contrast, signaled the individual and personal possession of a mental disposition thanks to 
which one had a proper—that is, causal—understanding of a domain of phenomena or ac-
tions, which, moreover, was not limited to the natural world. This is why theology could be 
deﬁned as the regina scientiarum, “the queen over the scientiae”—a deﬁnition that renders all 
talk of a “battle between science and theology” of course either logically impossible or termi-
nologically anachronistic.
Scholars dealing with Byzantium usually resolve this issue in the following way. When 
they do use the word “science,” as Anne Tihon does in her essay “Science in the Byzantine 
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Empire” in The Cambridge History of Science, they accept the terminological anachronism 
by classifying Byzantine knowledge claims according to modern scientiﬁc disciplines, such 
as mathematics, astronomy, geography, optics, botany, and so forth.5 Alternatively, when they 
refer to that large body of natural knowledge that included cosmology, physics, matter theory, 
and psychology, scholars speak of “natural philosophy,” which is the Aristotelian term that the 
Byzantines also used and which designated a philosophical discipline that was clearly linked 
to metaphysics and theology already by Aristotle himself—and even more clearly so in Greek 
and Latin Christianity.
Alas, Nicolaidis et alii do not feel the need to clarify this important terminological issue, 
and most of the time they project the modern meaning of “science” back to ages in which it 
did not exist, with the odd consequence that we hear them complain that Orthodox scholars 
failed to produce “groundbreaking new scientiﬁc ideas.” Their failure to deﬁne the nature of 
natural philosophy furthermore results in their apologetic remark that in Byzantium the “natu-
ral sciences were related to areas of knowledge that today are not thought of as scientiﬁc.” The 
sentence might instead have read as follows: “In the world of Greek Christianity, just as in the 
Latin West, there existed no natural sciences in our sense of the word.” In fact, with respect to 
the period up to roughly 1800, what our ﬁve authors often appear to mean by “science” is what 
they sometimes call “secular humanism,” an equally anachronistic way of referring to “pagan 
philosophy”—that is to say, the kind of Greek natural philosophy and metaphysics that Chris-
tian philosophy and theology combated, transformed, rejected, or absorbed.
To be sure, for the modern age, and certainly for the period after the entry of Newtonian 
physics or Darwinian biology into the Orthodox world, it certainly is meaningful to speak of 
science without using quotation marks. For those past two or three centuries, it would indeed 
be crucial to contrast the reactions of Orthodox churches, and notably of Greek and Russian 
Orthodoxy, with those of the various Western confessions, not only in conceptual and ideo-
logical terms but also in terms of political, economic, and institutional factors. Once again, a 
speciﬁc comparison of the Greek and Russian responses would have been enlightening.
By contrast, for the long period from late antiquity to the Renaissance, what one would need 
instead is a comparison of the ways in which the two dominant Christian religions went about 
ﬁtting the Greek heritage to their theological needs. On the face of it, given their largely shared 
textual basis, medieval Byzantine and Latin natural philosophy do not seem to have differed 
from one another in radical ways. After all, philosophers and theologians in both cultural and 
linguistic areas were confronted with the same problem of reconciling Jerusalem with Athens, 
Christianity with pagan philosophy. For example, could one reconcile Aristotle’s uncreated 
world with the Judeo-Christian account of Creation? 6 Differences between the two cultures—
for example, the major reliance in Byzantium on Stoic sources—seem to pale next to what they 
share in terms of common questions and answers.
i n S T i T u T i O n S
With respect to the institutions, the second and third of the above-mentioned maps appear to 
imply that the Greek Orthodox world possessed neither medieval and Renaissance universities 
nor early modern scientiﬁc academies. Surveys of Byzantine learning seem to conﬁrm this im-
pression: “There were in Byzantium no institutions of higher education in which philosophers 
could be trained as philosophers. The main purpose of institutional higher studies was to train 
5 Anne Tihon, “Science in the Byzantine Empire,” in The Cambridge History of Science, Vol. 2, ed. David C. Lindberg and 
Michael H. Shank (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), pp. 190–206.
6 See, e.g., Börje Bydén, “Natural Philosophy, Byzantine,” in The Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 858–863.
This content downloaded from 131.174.248.182 on April 10, 2019 04:49:14 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Isis—Volume 107, number 3, September 2016 571
v
ie
w
p
o
in
t
civil servants,” we are told by Katerina Ierodiakonou. And Sten Ebbesen adds that even in the 
thirteenth century, when Constantinople was ruled by the knights that had conquered it dur-
ing the Fourth Crusade (1204), “no university took root in the Greek world.”7 Whether this 
absence of institutes of higher learning was speciﬁcally due to a different attitude to the philo-
sophical disciplines on the part of the Orthodox Church is something one would have liked 
to learn from the article under discussion, but the topic is not broached by Nicolaidis et alii.
The Byzantine Empire is routinely described in the literature as “hierarchical (in both 
senses of the term), patriarchal, and authoritarian.” After drawn-out battles over the relation 
between emperor and patriarch, the ranking among the patriarchal sees, the Orthodox creed, 
and the deﬁnition of the nature of Christ, as well as two violent iconoclastic periods, the Sev-
enth Ecumenical Council (843), known as the “Triumph of Orthodoxy,” is said to have gen-
erated a certain stability at the doctrinal front—which, however, implied a rigid suppression 
of deviant views. “No manner of impiety [i.e., heresy] shall henceforth speak freely,” in the 
words of the patriarch Photius (867). The litany on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, the so-called 
Syndokon of Orthodoxy, contained a denunciation of errors and of individuals that maintained 
them.8 One would have liked to know whether this doctrinal practice differed from what one 
knows from the Latin Middle Ages and, if so, how. To be sure, there was no Holy Ofﬁce in 
Constantinople, no Index of Forbidden Books, and no trials for adherence to heliocentrism—
Catholic instruments of repression on which Draper’s conﬂict thesis puts much emphasis. 
But for purely chronological reasons, it is not evident whether we should therefore conclude 
that Orthodoxy was more open-minded with regard to “science.” After all, Constantinople was 
conquered by the Ottomans in 1453, and the last remains of the Byzantine Empire followed 
quickly thereafter. But 1453 is just about when printing was invented (without which an Index 
of Forbidden Books is meaningless); it is roughly sixty years before the Reformation (in reaction 
to which the Holy Ofﬁce was established in Rome) and ninety years before Copernicus’s De 
revolutionibus (for public adherence to which Galileo was condemned). Since, after 1453, the 
Greek Orthodox Church lacked the political and institutional power that the Catholic Church 
still possessed, we can only speculate about how it would have reacted to the events that the 
Catholic Church fought so forcefully. For this reason, again, it would have been illuminating 
to examine the response of Russian Orthodoxy, which had lost neither territory nor power to 
non-Christian conquerors.
D r A P e r ’ S  C O n f L i C T  T h e S i S
All of this brings us to the Draper thesis, with which Nicolaidis and his coauthors begin their 
essay and with which I propose to conclude mine. Nicolaidis et alii are fully aware that Drap-
er’s famous History of the Conﬂict between Religion and Science of 1875 was mainly directed 
at the Roman Catholicism of the 1870s and, more speciﬁcally, at the theocratic papacy and 
its all-Italian court, the curia: “Look at its composition! It consists of pope, cardinal bishops, 
cardinal deacons, who at the present moment are Italians; cardinal priests, nearly all Italians; 
ministers and secretaries of the Sacred Congregation in Rome, all Italians.” In the 1850s and 
1860s, Risorgimento Italy had moved toward uniﬁcation under one crown, and in 1871, exactly 
four years before Draper’s book was published, the last missing region, the pontiﬁcal state, was 
conquered by monarchical troops. In his drawn-out ﬁght against these developments, the pope 
had not only declared himself infallible but had launched an out-and-out war on modernity. In 
7 Katerina Ierodiakonou, “Introduction,” in Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources, ed. Ierodiakonou (cit. n. 1), pp. 1–13, 
on p. 4; and Ebbesen, “Greek–Latin Philosophical Interaction,” p. 25. 
8 Dion C. Smythe, “Byzantine Empire,” in Censorship: A World Encyclopedia, ed. Derek Jones (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 
2001), pp. 394 –395, on p. 395.
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so doing, in Draper’s eyes, the Catholic Church, held hostage by a few noble Italian families, 
espoused an intolerably extremist position. Given the aim of his book, which was to expose 
the prehistory of the pope’s antimodernism, it comes as no surprise that Draper explained: “I 
have had little to say respecting the two great Christian confessions, the Protestant and Greek 
Churches.” As for the Greek Orthodox Church, it looked to Draper disempowered and meek 
enough, although there is little evidence that he dedicated any time to investigating its doc-
trinal positions. As for the other confessions, he held that “none of the Protestant Churches 
has ever occupied a position so imperious” as the Catholic Church. But this is not the whole 
story: in Draper’s eyes, the Protestant Churches were not only involved in the history of sci-
ence negatively, by lacking the power to stop it, but also positively, as “modern Science is the 
legitimate sister—indeed, it is the twin-sister—of the Reformation.”9 
His thesis regarding Protestantism shall not detain us here; what is of interest in the present 
context is that in narrating the prehistory of the antimodernist and antiscientiﬁc attitude of the 
Catholic Church, Draper conveniently forgets that the Jewish messianic movement that eventu-
ally became the state religion of the Roman Empire was not called “Catholicism” and that the 
confessional subdivisions he handles are of a later date. Nor was the initial persecution of pagan 
philosophy, and whatever may with hindsight be called “scientiﬁc” about it, speciﬁcally Catho-
lic. Take the clash between the Patriarch of Alexandria, Cyril, and the philosopher Hypathia, 
famous daughter of the equally famous mathematician Theon, which ended with the atrocious 
murder of the philosopher in 415. “Hypathia and Cyril! Philosophy and bigotry. They cannot 
exist together,” Draper exclaims. Why this episode should belong exclusively to the history of 
Catholicism and not equally to that of the Orthodox Church remains however unexplained.10 
Draper conveniently forgets that the Great Schism, which formally separated the two Churches, 
occurred in 1054, a full six centuries after Hypathia—who, moreover, spoke Greek.
Like Nicolaidis et alii, Draper thus tends to project constellations deﬁning the modern 
age back to centuries that in reality should be categorized differently. In Draper’s case, it is 
Pope Pius IX’s antimodernism whose roots are sought as far back as the ﬁrst centuries a.d. 
But Draper’s leitmotif of Catholic theology as an impediment to science implies not only an 
anachronistic application of confessional distinctions to earlier ages but also a willful omission 
of the constructive role of the ecclesiastical hierarchies in the founding of schools, universities, 
and teaching orders, which resulted in the medieval ﬂourishing of learning, which in turn was 
a necessary, though certainly not a sufﬁcient, reason for the emergence of modern science. 
In the case of Nicolaidis et alii, the observation that, in the modern age, “Eastern Christianity 
scarcely participated in the making of the new European science” leads to a backward projec-
tion of a modern notion of science to a period in which it cannot possibly be found. 
This does not mean that it would not be highly meaningful to ask the same question that has 
been asked with respect to China and the Islamic world: Why did the Scientiﬁc Revolution not 
take place in China or the Middle East—or, for that matter, in Byzantium?11 In order to ﬁnd a 
satisfactory answer, I suggest, we would need a close comparison of the intellectual, political, in-
stitutional, and economic factors deﬁning the evolution of West and East European societies. In 
such a comparison, religion would obviously have to play an important role, in its various guises: 
religion as a social force, as a theological system, as a political power, and as a worldview.
9 John William Draper, History of the Conﬂict between Religion and Science (London: Henry S. King, 1875), pp. 341, x, xi, 353.
10 Ibid., p. 55.
11 For a discussion of all three regions—China, the Islamic world, and the Byzantine Empire—see H. Floris Cohen, How Mod-
ern Science Came into the World: Four Civilizations, One Seventeenth-Century Breakthrough (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. 
Press, 2012), esp. Ch. 1.
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